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The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter 
relationship on the price performance of IPOs in the Turkish market. IPOs by related 
underwriters are found to exhibit higher levels of underpricing. Empirical evidence does 
not lend support for the certification effect. The outcome of higher underpricing may be 
due to deliberate underpricing by the related underwriter in order to make subsequent IPOs 
by the same group more attractive or may have to do with market recognition of potential 
conflict of interest.
The pricing behavior of initial public offerings (IPOs) has attracted widespread 
research attention both in developed and emerging markets. Explanations for the widely 
documented IPO underpricing phenomenon differ according to firm characteristics, market 
regulations and other contextual factors. Different factors are found to affect the magnitude 
and causes of underpricing across both developed and emerging markets. The main 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter relationship on 
the price performance of IPOs in one of the emerging market settings, namely Turkey.
 
Emerging markets are characterized by severe agency and information asymmetry problems 
stemming from ineffective regulatory environment, weak minority shareholder protection.
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and the domination of family business groups (Sullivan and Unite, 2001). In a typical 
emerging market, financial institutions and regulatory framework are newly developing and 
market participants are relatively less experienced. The Turkish market resembles other 
emerging markets in many respects. Continual changes in regulations, information 
asymmetry issues, agency problems, and family control also prevail in the Turkish context 
(Guner et al.; 2000; Muradoglu, 2000; Yurtoglu, 2001). Thus, this setting presents itself as 
a valuable ground to investigate the role of the issuer-underwriter relationship in the IPO 
price performance.
Similar to previous empirical findings in the Turkish market (Guner et al; 2000; 
Kiymaz, 2000), persistent abnormal returns are also detected in this study. Differential IPO 
underpricing across related and unrelated IPOs may be due the certification effect and 
conflict of interest. When the issuer and the underwriter are related, the inherent 
information advantage might lead to a better certification and/or conflict of interest 
problem, all of which may have different effects on underpricing. Reputational concerns 
play a pivotal role in determining which effect will dominate. Evidence indicates greater 
underpricing when the underwriter and the issuer belong to the same group. Related IPOs 
are found to belong to larger issuing companies, involving greater amounts of proceeds and 
higher percentages of equity offered. The presence of greater underpricing in related issues 
does not lend support for the certification explanation of underpricing. When the IPOs are 
reclassified according to the lead imderwriter’s involvement with the related issue, 
significant differences are not observed among the abnormal returns in IPOs by different 
groups of underwriters. However, the highest abnormal returns belong to IPOs by 
underwriters conducting only-related issues.
In IPOs by underwriters engaging in both related and unrelated issues, defined here 
as the mixed group, related issues are found to exhibit significantly greater underpricing 
than that in unrelated issues. This further suggests the irrelevance of the certification effect 
in the Turkish context. However, this does not necessarily lend direct evidence for the 
conflict of interest explanation, as this effect largely depends on the market’s ability to 
capture it. If such a conflict of interest is recognized by market participants, underpricing 
may occur in the form of additional compensation demanded by investors. This study raises 
an alternative explanation which warrants further investigation of group-driven motives for 
such an occurrence. When the lead underwriter and the issuer belong to the same group of 
companies, underpricing might be viewed as a mechanism through which prospective 
investors are enticed to participate in subsequent offers by the same group.
Previous Studies
Empirical evidence from numerous studies on IPO’s suggests the presence of three 
distinct patterns of price behavior in developed markets: initial underpricing, cycles in the 
extent of underpricing, and long-run underperformance (Ritter, 2002). Initial underpricing 
of IPOs is also widely documented in various emerging market settings (Loughran et al; 
1995) including the Turkish market (Kiymaz, 2000; Guner et al; 2000). Another pattern 
observed in emerging markets is that underpricing exhibits a decreasing trend as financial 
markets evolve (Su and Fleisher, 1999).
Despite a general consensus on the presence of price patterns in the extant 
literature, different explanations and theoretical perspectives are presented. An important 
vein of explanations focuses on the information asymmetry argument. This explanation 
seems to gain more importance in emerging markets, where contextual characteristics 
contribute to the information asymmetries besides the usual IPO-inherent asymmetries.
The existence of informational asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors (Rock, 1986), and between underwriters and issuers (Baron, 1982) are initially put
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forth as explanations for the well-documented abnormal return phenomenon. In the case of 
informational asymmetry between underwriters and issuers, the issuer’s inability to 
perfectly monitor the underwriters’ distribution efforts is claimed to result in greater 
underpricing. However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) fail to lend supportive 
evidence to this hypothesis. In their study of self-marketed offerings, where information 
asymmetry is presumed to be absent, they still document significant underpricing.
As an alternative explanation, third party certification is suggested to reduce 
underpricing by decreasing any ex-ante uncertainty about the firm value. If the 
underwriters inappropriately reduce the offer price by a considerable amount, they are likely 
to be punished by subsequent losses in market share (Dunbar, 1999). Such reputational 
concerns are claimed to produce a sufficient incentive to more fairly price the firm. 
Supportingly, venture capital backing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 
1997) and the existence of a banking relationship (James and Wier, 1990) are found to 
lower the extent of underpricing, largely due to the certification effect. However, the 
certification effect, which might reduce informational asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors, becomes blurred when there is a potential conflict of interest between the 
certifying party and the issuer (Hamao et al; 2000). They point out that if outside investors 
perceive a potential conflict of interest, they would demand more underpricing as 
compensation. However, reputational concerns may alleviate this effect and a conflict of 
interest might not influence that much underpricing. How the market reacts to the combined 
effect of certification and conflict of interest would seem to determine the final outcome. 
While conflicts of interests do not seem to affect IPO pricing in the U.S. as reputational 
concerns dominate (Gompers and Lemer, 1999), the evidence on Japanese markets (Hamao 
et al; 2000) and on Philippines markets (Sullivan and Unite, 2001) indicate that the problem 
of conflicts of interest is taken as more relevant by market participants and this leads to 
greater underpricing.
The interaction between certification and conflict of interest becomes operational 
when the underwriter and the issuer are affiliated. In the presence of affiliation, the lead 
underwriter might have the incentive to market the issue more aggressively and to overstate 
the stock value (Hamao et al; 2000), leading to lower underpricing. On the other hand, Puri
(1999) suggests that private information obtained through affiliation might have two 
opposing effects. First, it might cause a conflict of interest such that the underwriter may 
misrepresent the value of the issuing firm. Second, better pricing might be ensured as the 
underwriter certifies the firm value more accurately.
Affiliation is also said to exist when a venture capitalist who holds financial claims 
in the issuing firm’s assets acts as the lead underwriter. However, empirical evidence is 
mixed on this issue. In the U.S. market, Megginson and Weiss (1991) report lower 
underpricing in IPOs where the venture capitalist is also the underwriter. They argue that 
lower initial returns can be taken as a sign of increased certification and reduction of 
information asymmetry between inside and outside investors. However, in Japanese and 
Philippine IPO markets, higher underpricing is documented in venture-backed IPOs 
(Hamao et al; 2000; Sullivan and Unite 2001) as market participants demand more 
underpricing to compensate for the perceived conflict of interest.
The Turkish Market
The Istanbul Stock Exchange was legally established in 1981 with the enactment of 
the Capital Market Law. However, it became operational in 1986. In time, the development 
of the ISE became highly representative of an emerging market with rapid growth in terms 
of market capitalization, trade volume, and number of listed companies as well as high 
volatility in returns. At the beginning of 1986, 42 stocks were listed and the annual volume
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of trade was $13 million. The annual volume of trade topped $181.9 billion in 2000. Not 
surprisingly, the market capitalization of the ISE grew fast. It increased from $0.9 billion at 
year end 1986 to $114 billion by the end of 1999, before declining to $69.5 billion by the 
end of 2000. Developments in the ISE are presented in Table I.
Different amendments to the Capital Market Law since 1981 contributed to the 
development of regulations and procedures governing the IPO market in Turkey. Currently, 
the first stage of the IPO process starts with the registration of the prospective issuing 
company with the Capital Market Board (CMB), which is the regulatory institution for the 
financial markets in Turkey. The main focus at the registration stage is on assuring that 
adequate and non-misleading information is provided to the public. It should be noted that 
the CMB does not authorize but only permits prospective issuers to proceed with the IPO, 
ascertaining that all of the documents required by the related legislation are disclosed fully 
and correctly. All financial statements submitted to the CMB for registration must be 
approved by certified independent auditors. In the following stage, the prospective issuer 
has to sign a contract of intermediation with one or more of the underwriting firms 
authorized by the CMB. Both auditors and intermediary institutions can still be held legally 
responsible for their failure in providing fair and non-misleading information.
The CMB also sets the ground rules for the underwriting and sales procedures. 
Underwriting can be on the basis of either best-efforts or firm commitment. The latter may 
be designed as either a stand-by agreement or a full commitment agreement. Under the 
stand-by arrangement, the underwriter is obligated to assume in full and cash all unsold 
shares at the end of the selling process, while full commitment requires full payment for all 
the shares right before the selling process starts. In regard to capital adequacy, the CMB 
imposes certain restrictions on the amount that a given intermediary institution can 
underwrite. Financial responsibility from previous issues continues until all underwriting 
requirements are fullfilled by the underwriter. This illustrates the importance of the previous 
experience and reputation of the underwriter embedded in the IPO process. If the 
underwriting is carried out by a syndicate, the intermediary institution designated as the lead 
underwriter assumes all responsibility of the issue against all related governmental agencies 
including the CMB, the issuer, and the third parties.
The development of the IPO market in Turkey is presented in Table n. Since the 
inception of the EPO market in Turkey, 261 IPOs have been completed, generating total 
proceeds of over 6.3 billion U.S. dollars. There is no apparent time pattern in the IPOs, 
both in terms of the number of IPOs and the proceeds. The market has displayed an erratic 
pattern. 1990 and 2000 have been the most active years for IPOs. It may be noted that the 
large volume of IPOs in 1990 was mainly due to large scale privatization sales in that year. 
The activity in 2000 was largely due to the overoptimism prevailing in the economy in that 
period. However, the overoptimism of 2000 was reversed by the economic crisis of 2001, 
which can be noticed easily as only two IPOs took place between January 2001 and July 
2002.
Data and Methodology
The data includes all the IPOs since the start of the IPO market in Turkey, covering 
the period from January 1990 to July 2002. Excluding two IPOs by two soccer clubs\ the 
remaining total number of IPOs during this period is 259. The data on daily stock prices.
 ^Two prominent but heavily indebted soccer teams rely on IPO as they realize club membership loyalty 
would override lack of economic attractiveness.
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market index values, all firm and issue characteristics regarding the offers are obtained from 
the electronic database of the ISE.^
Initial price performance is measured by calculating three return figures. The first is 
the first-day raw return (RRl), calculated as the percentage difference between the offer 
price and the first day closing price. Second, market-adjusted rates of return are calculated 
by subtracting the return on the ISE index from that on the stock on the first (ARl), second 
(AR2), third (AR3) and fourth (AR4) day of trading after the offer. Third, these market- 
adjusted returns are cumulated to the end of the third, seventh and tenth day of trading to get 
the cumulative rates of return CAR3, CAR7 and CAR 10, respectively.
The other variables used in the study are denoted and defined as AGE (the age of the 
issuing firm at the time of the IPO, expressed in years since the establishment), SIZE (the 
pre-IPO market value of the company), OFFPER (the percentage of total equity offered to 
the public), PROCEEDS (the number of shares sold times the offer price), LEADEX (the 
number of previous IPOs by the lead underwriter), LEADEXD (the total dollar value of 
previous IPOs by the lead underwriter), and UNDNUMBER (the number of underwriters 
participating in the IPO).
The relationship between the issuer and the underwriter is defined and explored in 
two dimensions. First, an EPO is designated as a related issue when the issuer and the 
underwriter belong to the same group of companies. In these cases, comparisons are made 
across related and unrelated issue categories. Second, underwriters are classifed into three 
groups depending on the relatedness to the IPOs they conduct. The first group (the mixed 
group) contains those underwriting both related and unrelated issues. The second group and 
the third group contain those underwriting only related issues {only-related group) and 
those dealing with only unrelated issues {only-unrelated group), respectively. Comparisons 
are then made among these three groups.
Empirical Findings
A first-step examination of the empirical evidence on the Turkish EPO market 
demonstrates that the initial price performance is similar to that in both developed and 
other emerging markets. Table HI reports the average initial return performance of the IPO 
market in Turkey. Statistically significant abnormal returns, which are observed during the 
first two days, indicate the presence of underpricing. Daily abnormal returns beyond the 
second day are not statistically different fi*om zero. The most pronounced daily return is 
observed in the first day and exceeds 11%, with and without market adjustment. The 
cumulative abnormal return reaches to 16.2% on the third day, increases to 20.4% on the 
seventh day, and levels off thereafter.
Before analyzing in detail the differences in price performance of IPOs by different 
categories of underwiters, some basic characteristics of related and unrelated issues are 
initially compared and the results are reported in Table IV. Although the average age (AGE) 
of the issuing companies of IPOs by related underwriters (14.77 years) is lower than that by 
unrelated underwriters (17.62), the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, the 
differences between related and unrelated underwriters with respect to the number of 
underwriters in the syndicate (UNDNUMBER) and also with respect to the previous IPO 
value underwritten (LEADEXD) are not statistically significant. Unrelated underwriters, 
however, seem to have underwritten more IPOs in the past (LEADEX) than related 
underwriters. More importantly, both the average company value going public (SIZE) and 
also the percentage of equity offered to the public (OFFPER) via related underwriters are 
statistically significantly greater than those via unrelated underwriters. The average SIZE
’ Available at www.imkb.gov.tr.
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figures are $418m and $90m for related and unrelated issues, respectively. The two findings 
directly imply the PROCEEDS with related underwriters is significantly greater than that 
with unrelated underwriters. Furthermore, related underwriters seem to generate these 
greater volumes with a smaller number of underwriters in the syndicate (LEADEX) than 
unrelated underwriters.
The above findings suggest that related underwriters engage in the IPOs of larger 
companies with greater amounts of proceeds and a higher percentage of equity offered. 
Dealing with larger sized companies may imply an extra incentive (for example, higher 
underwriting revenues) for the related underwriter to process more information. Moreover, 
the existence of a equity relationship may mitigate any problems associated with 
information asymmetries between the underwriter and the issuer. Both of these factors 
would seem to imply a lower overall underpricing in IPOs conducted by related 
underwriters, provided that the information advantage leads to better certification. However, 
it should be noted that this information advantage can also be used against the interests of 
outside investors, who in turn may require extra compensation for this conflict of interest. 
Whether certification or conflict of interest is in effect is thus an empirical issue. If 
reputational concerns dominate, underpricing may be expected to be lower. On the other 
hand, if the conflict of interest problem is deemed to be more important, higher 
underpricing may be expected. The answer would then depend on the perceptions of the 
market participants. Another cause for underpricing might be due to strategic behavior by 
the lead underwriter. Such a pricing strategy may occur in both related and unrelated issues. 
However, it is possibly more pronounced when the imderwriter and the issuer belong to the 
same group of companies. In such a setting, in addition to possible reputational concerns of 
the underwriter, group-driven factors might also be in effect. Such factors might result in 
deliberate underpricing, especially in earlier IPOs of the group. Making other group 
company subsequent offers more attractive and reallocating cash flow within the group can 
be mentioned as possible internally driven motives for such behavior.
To investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter relationship on abnormal returns, 
different analyses are conducted for different subsamples of relatedness. Differences in 
abnormal returns between the IPOs by related and unrelated issues are initially examined 
and the results are reported in Table V. Both the average raw return and the average 
abnormal return during the first day after the IPOs by related underwriters are significantly 
greater than those by unrelated underwriters. Specifically, the first day average market 
adjusted return for related IPOs isl8.15%, while it is 8.70% for unrelated IPOs. However, 
beyond the first day of trading, no significant differences can be seen in either daily or 
cumulative abnormal returns. The higher underpricing in related issues is interestingly 
noticable only in the first day of trading after the offering.
Higher underpricing in the presence of an equity relationship between the 
underwriter and the issuer seems to undermine the relevance of the certification and the 
reduced informational asymmetry explanations of underpricing. Therefore, these results 
might be attributable to the conflict of interest and/or strategic pricing explanations 
mentioned above.
To investigate the presence of strategic pricmg in IPOs by related underwriters, a 
series of comparisons are made between different underwriter categories. When 
underwriters are classified into mixed, only-related and only-unrelated groups, underpricing 
is expected to differ across IPOs by these groups of underwriters. Especially, if group- 
driven factors are in effect, the highest underpricing is anticipated for IPOs by the only- 
related group of underwriters. Table VI displays the empirical differences in the average 
returns between the three groups of underwriters. Although average underpricing on the
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first day of trading for the only-related-group is in the anticipated direction and magnitude, 
differences between the three groups are not statistically significant.
The case of the mixed group, which involves both related and unrelated issues by 
the same underwriter, may help clarify any possible motives of underpricing. Underwriters 
in the mixed group may have both internally and externally motivated intentions. For 
example, differential underpricing between related and unrelated issues by the same 
underwriter would suggest the presence of group-driven motives. According to a strategic 
pricing argument, underpricing is expected to be greater in related issues belonging to the 
mixed group. Of the 183 IPOs conducted by the mixed-group of underwriters, 48 belong to 
companies within the same group. Considering both raw and market adjusted returns in 
Table VII, the average first-day return is around 17% for related issues, while it is around 
7% for unrelated issues and the difference is statistically significant. This finding is 
consistent with the strategic pricing argument. However, it should be noted that this 
difference may also be due to the learning effect in that underwriters could gain experience 
through time. To control for this learning effect, differences in the time of offering between 
related and unrelated EPOs are investigated and no significant differences are found in the 
timing of the two different groups. Specifically, related and unrelated issues do not 
significantly differ in terms of both calendar ranking and the year of issue. Finally, beyond 
the initial trading day, no further evidence of different pricing behavior is observed between 
related and unrelated issues by the mixed-group of underwriters.
It can be argued that if underwriters use underpricing as a means to generate further 
future demand for companies within the same group, the degree of underpricing may be 
expected to decline in subsequent offers. To check for this eventuality, the related issues, 
which represent about 25% of the total sample, are regrouped in order of occurrence in 
time. As the empirical evidence in Table VIII suggests, the extent of underpricing actually 
declines in time, albeit to a statistically insignificant degree. Nevertheless, the average 
abnormal return of the first related issue is 27.2%, which drops to 16.9% in the second 
offer, and then to 9.1% in the third and subsequent offers. If this trend is to continue into the 
future, statistical significance may also be eventually seen.
Conclusions
This study provided new evidence of the underpricing of initial public offerings and 
investigated its possible causes in the Turkish equity markets, where a pattern of significant 
daily abnormal returns for the first two days of trading is observed. However, the extent of 
underpricing seems to depend on the relationship between the underwriter and the issuer. 
IPOS’s by related underwriters are significantly more underpriced than the others. When 
this finding is further detailed in line with the “conflict of interest” and “certification effect” 
arguments in the literature, both similarities and also differences are found between the 
Turkish markets and other markets of the world. The conflict of interest argument seems to 
be supported, while the presence of any certification effect is not clear.
In future work, it would be interesting to continue this research topic in two 
dimensions. The nature of any association between the underwriter and the issues may be 
set up with more detail. Second, a comparative international study based on the same 
assumed structure of relationship details may provide a common explanation for all of the 
countries.
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Table I 
The Development of the ISE
Year
Volume o f Trade Total Market 
Capitalization
Annual 
Rate o f  
ReturnTotal Daily Average
USD Million USD Million USD Million %TL
1986 13 0.05 938 71
1987 118 0.47 3,125 294
1988 115 0.45 1,128 -44
1989 773 3.03 6,756 493
1990 5,854 23.70 18,737 47
1991 8,502 34.42 15,564 34
1992 8,567 34.13 9,922 -8
1993 21,771 88.50 37,824 417
1994 23,203 91.71 21,785 32
1995 52,357 208.59 20,782 47
1996 37,737 152.78 30,797 144
1997 58,104 230.57 61,879 254
1998 70,396 283.85 33,975 -25
1999 84,034 356.08 114,271 485
2000 181,934 739.57 69,507 -38
Table II 
Size of the Turkish IPO Market
Number o f IPOs Proceeds
# % (1,000 USD) %
1990 34 13.13 1,308,572 20.73
1991 21 8.11 343,979 5.45
1992 13 5.02 93,153 1.48
1993 16 6.18 152,447 2.41
1994 25 9.65 270,480 4.28
1995 28 10.81 245,85 3.89
1996 27 10.42 167,922 2.66
1997 29 11.20 419,802 6.65
1998 20 7.72 404,744 6.41
1999 9 3.47 87,413 1.38
2000 35 13.51 2,800,805 44.36
2001 1 0.39 243 0.00
2002* 1 0.39 18,783 0.30
Total 259 100.00 6,313,626 100.00
* As of July 2002, excluding two IPOs by soccer clubs.
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Table III 
Initial Return Statistics
Mean Std.Error t -value Sig.
RRl 11.01 1.59 6.89 0.000
A R l 11.04 1.58 6.99 0.000
AR2 3.57 1.03 1.03 0.001
AR3 0.88 0.59 1.50 0.135
AR4 0.76 0.40 1.88 0.061
CARS 16.24 2.12 7.65 0.000
CAR7 20.43 3.14 6.52 0.000
CARIO 20.19 3.31 6.11 0.000
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents 
market-adjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and 
AR4 are market adjusted retums on days two, three and four, 
respectively. CARS, CAR7 and CAR 10 denote cumulative market- 
adjusted retums at the end of the third, seventh and tenth day of 
trading, respectively.
Table IV
Differences in IPO Characteristics: Related - Unrelated Issues
Related Issues Unrelated Issues
(n=64) (n=195)
Variables Mean Mean F-statistic Sig.
AGE (year) 14.77 17.62 2.21 0.138
ISlZK ($ thousand) 418,080 90,687 4.50 0.035
OFFPER (%) 29.40 23.27 5.17 0.024
PROCEEDS(($ thousand) 51,026 15,631 4.57 0.033
LEADEX (number) 6.27 8.59 4.01 0.046
LEADEXD ($ thousand) 165,697 172,050 0.03 0.863
UNDNUMBER (number) 3.45 4.53 0.07 0.798
AGE: age of the issuing firm at the time of t le IPO; SIZE: pre-IPO market value of
the company; OFFPER: percentage of total equity offered to the public; 
PROCEEDS: number of shares sold times the offer price; LEADEX: number of 
previous IPOs by the lead underwriter; LEADEXD: total dollar value of previous
 
IPOs by the lead underwriter; UNDNUMBER: number of underwriters participating 
in the IPO.
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Table V
Differences in Abnormal Returns: Related Unrelated Issues
Related Issues
(n=64)
Unrelated Issues
(n=195)
Variables Mean Mean F-statistic Sig.
RRl
A R l
AR2
AR3
CAR3
CAR7
CARIO
17.78 
18.15
1.78 
0.35 
20.95 
24.31 
25.45
8.77
8.70
4.16 
1.06 
14.69
19.16 
18.46
6.07
6.85
0.99
0.27
1.63
0.50
0.83
0.014
0.009
0.321
0.603
0.203
0.479
0.362
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents market- 
adjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market 
adjusted retums on days two, three and four, respectively. CAR3, CAR? and 
CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted retums at the end of the third, 
seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.
Table VI
Differences in Abnormal Returns across Different Groups of
Underwriters
IPOs by Underwriters
Mixed Group Only Related Group Only Unrelated Group
(n=183) (n=15) (n=55)
Mean Mean Mean F-value Sig.
RRl 9.?5 22.81 11.19 1.68 0.188
ARl 9.71 22.98 11.40 1.79 0.169
AR2 2.98 0.16 2.39 0.64 0.528
AR3 1.09 -2.96 1.22 1.23 0.294
CAR3 14.91 19.50 14.52 0.15 0.859
CAR? 19.60 16.95 17.63 0.05 0.952
CARIO 19.86 23.86 15.13 0.24 0.786
RRl indicates raw retum on the first day of trading. ARl represents market-adjusted retum on the 
first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market adjusted retums on days two, three and four 
respectively. CAR3, CAR? and CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted retums at the end of the 
third, seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.
Table VII
Differences in Abnormal Returns within the Mixed Group
RRl
ARl
AR2
AR3
CAR3
CAR7
CARIO
IPOs by Mixed Group
Related Issues
(n=48)
Mean
16.64
16.98
2.06
1.03
21.01
25.18
25.09
Unrelated Issues
(n=135)
Mean F-value
7.30 5.92 0.016
7.12 6.93 0.009
3.30 0.56 0.455
1.11 0.00 0.959
12.73 2.59 0.109
17.61 0.91 0.341
17.99 0.73 0.394
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents market- 
adjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market 
adjusted returns on days two, three and four, respectively. CAR3, CAR7 and 
CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted returns at the end of the third, 
seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.
Table VHI
Differences in Abnormal Returns in Related Issues
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First related Second related Third or more related
(n=26) (n=15) (n=23)
Mean Mean Mean F-value Sig.
RRl 26.86 16.39 8.99 1.53 0.224
ARl 27.19 16.92 9.13 1.66 0.199
AR2 2.72 0.72 0.93 0.31 0.735
AR3 0.50 1.46 -1.05 0.53 0.591
CAR3 31.11 20.28 9.10 2.19 0.121
CAR7 32.09 32.19 8.41 1.86 0.164
CARIO 31.84 41.57 7.41 2.17 0.123
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents market-adjusted return on the 
first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market adjusted returns on days two, three and four, 
respectively. CAR3, CAR7 and CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted returns at the end of the 
third, seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.

